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From Periphery to Center:
A Review of Edward C. Keefer and :Myra
Burton, eds. Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1969-1976, val. 28: Southern Africa
Ryan M. Irwin

he history of southern Africa changed at 12:20 AM on
April25, 1974. If at that moment you had been listening
to Lisbon's Radio Renascen<;a, you'd have heard
an eerie rendition of the song "Grandola, Vila Morena."
Composed by musician Zeca Afonso two years earlier, the
quiet ballad eulogized fraternity, democracy, and fairnessvalues that had eroded under a forty-year dictatorship in
Portugal. "It is the people who lead I Inside of you, oh city,"
Afonso sang. "It is the people who lead I In the shadow of
a holm oak I Which no longer knew its age." His words
announced the beginning of a carefully orchestrated
military coup-months in the planning-against Prime
Minister Marcelo Caetano, who had ruled the country since
its previous dictator, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, suffered
a stroke in 1968. Later named the Carnation Revolution,
the affair was over within hours. Caetano accerted exile in
Brazil; and a military junta, led first by Genera Antonio de
Spinola and then Francisco da Costa Gomes, took the reins
of government to establish a framework to end Portuguese
colonialism in Africa and create a genuine democracy at
home. When the junta disbanded two years later, Portugal
was a fundamentally different country, and southern
Africa-the region where so many anti-Caetano soldiers
had fought and died in the name of empire-was being
transformed by the dual imperatives of decolonization and
superpower geopolitics.
The coup unfolded in the shadow of the Watergate
scandal, and it shows up as a memo-written by Henry
Kissinger on April 29, 1974-about one-third of the way
into Myra Burton's new Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1969-1976, vol. 28, Southern Africa. "A reorientation
of Portugal away from Africa and toward Europe could
be traumatic," Kissinger speculated to President Richard
Nixon. However, he continued, there was "little reaction to
[the coup] from the Portuguese territories of Africa," and
the "local governments [were] urging business-as-usual"
(98). 1 His diagnosis hinted at the quiet before a storm. As
Burton demonstrates, events in southern Africa consumed
Washington during the next two years. Although Kissinger
had derisively suggested in 1969 that "history [had]
never been produced in the South," the region moved
inexorably from the periphery to the center of U.S foreign
relations after 1974. 2 Whether in Angola, where Portuguese
decolonization prompted an ill-fated U.S. covert operation
that led to an acrimonious congressional investigation, or
in Zimbabwe, where Kissinger became deeply involved in
peace negotiations, top U.S. officials found it impossible
to ignore the historical transformations that unfolded
in tne wake of the Carnation Revolution. The region was
the first great battleground of the post-Vietnam Cold
War, and events there were the harbinger of changes that
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would remake U.S. global power in the last quarter of the
twentieth century.
Burton's document collection is one of the better
FRUS volumes I have read. By selectively blending policy
statements and memoranda with meeting minutes and
phone records, she rrovides the reader with a useful
summary of official thinking and quotable anecdotes to
illuminate the frustrations, eccentricities, and hubris of
U.S. leaders. The collection is organized in four chapters
that proceed chronologically and thematically. The first
section, entitled "Regional Issues," covers the Nixon
administration's early dealings with southern Africa,
lingering on the formation of National Security Study
Memorandum 39, which announced that regional change
would only come through collaboration witn white rulers,
and the passage of the so-called Byrd Amendment, which
rolled back U.S. sanctions against Ian Smith's controversial
government in Salisbury. The second and third sections
flow together, covering Portuguese decolonization and
the Angolan civil war between 1974 and 1976. Here,
Burton expertly highlights the role of Zambia and Zaire
in prodding the United States into action and illustrates
how the Cold War helped distil a complex reality into
easy bullet points in Washington. The volume ends with
a section called "Independence Negotiations," which
explores Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in the region at the
end of 1976. Eager perhaps to rehabilitate his reputation
after the Angolan debacle, the secretary of state essentially
renounced National Security Study Memorandum 39 and
nudged Smith into indirect dialogue with Tanzania's Julius
Nyerere, Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, and several of the
liberation organizations, setting the stage for initiatives
that carried into the Jimmy Carter administration.
This period and region have already been examined in
two of our field's more prominent international histories,
Piero Gleijeses's Conflicting Missions (Chapel Hill, 2002)
and Odd Arne Westad's The Global Cold War (Cambridge,
2005). Burton's collection, in part, confirms the conclusions
of these books. For instance, Gleijeses's once-controversial
claim that Angola's MPLA had more support than UNITA
or FNLA and therefore possessed more 1egitimacy than its
rivals is tacitly confirmed by U.S. consular cables, meetings
minutes, and policy documents. Kissinger was at his most
cynical in 1975. Although he made no secret of his belief
that the "history of Africa [had] shown that a nation's only
focal point [was] the capital" (113) and admitted that the
MPLA controlled Luanda and most of Angola's populated
areas (135), the secretary nonetheless moved against
conventional wisdom in Washington and put America's
weight behind an illogical covert operation that ended in
disaster. "What real choice do we have?" he queried blandly
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as CIA funds flowed into the region that summer. "I know
the AF bureau says that [Africans] care about economic
aid, but there's no empirical evidence for that" (111). The
subsequent civil war lasted twenty-five years, left 500,000
Angolans dead, and put the MPLA (eventually) at the helm
of a country engulfed by AIDS and ethnic strife. Could this
bloodshed and devastation have been avoided without U.S.
meddling? Reading Burton's collection, it is hard not to
marvel at Kissinger's callousness:
William Hyland [INR Director]: We will have a
problem of answering critics.
Kissinger: I'm relaxed .... So what if critics
attack us, we can't be faulted. What grounds
would they use?
H: They can claim that we are perpetuating
war by arming the people; that we will turn a
civil conflict into a bloodbath.
K: What would they have us do, abandon the
country to the Communists? (123)
For culturalists, there is suggestive evidence that
racism influenced U.S. policy thinking. Especially in the
early years, when Wasnington was so intent on rejecting
African initiatives at the United Nations, Nixon and
Kissinger refer to Africans casually as cannibals, savages,
and uneducated na1fs. "Mobutu I think is a semi-savage,"
Kissinger stated casually at the height of the Angolan
crisis in 1975. "You can say we gave [FNLA's] Roberto
[dollar amount not declassified] but he didn't need money, but
strategy. Does Mobutu know strategy?" (111). Yet many of
the African politicians Kissinger dealt with were shrewd
rhetoricians who flirted dexterously with the meaning of
words and knew how to manipulate an audience. "When
I come to Africa, you'll attack American imperialism?"
the secretary asked Zambia's foreign minister in late 1975.
"Yes," the minister responded, "so they'll listen to the rest!
[Laughter]" (150).
A deeper conceptual question shapes this well-crafted
collection: Did the United States actually shape events in
southern Africa or did it follow the initiatives of others?
For Gleijeses, of course, the United States was "in the lead"
by the mid-1970s, "flanked by Zaire and South Africa,"
with England and France "at the rear." 3 But this is not the
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only possible conclusion. As Burton shows, at the height
of the Angolan crisis, Kissinger's support of UNITA and
FNLA stemmed primarily from ongoing conversations
with Zambia's Kaunda and Zaire's Mobutu, who lamented
MPLA's Agostinho Neto and saw U.S. action as a means to
influence their new neighbor. Only moments after calling
Mobutu a semi-savage, the secretary declared, "[First,J
we consider Zaire one of the two or three key countries
in Africa. Two, we consider him one of the two or three
key leaders in Africa. Three, we want to cooperate with
him" (111). Washington's subsequent covert aid went
not to UNITA and FNLA but to Mobutu's government;
and Kissinger rarely pursued goals that were wholly
inconsonant with tne recommendations of the frontline
states, especially after 1974. The situation on the groundeven the existential issue of communism-was secondary
to America's "credibility" with Zaire and South Africa, as
well as Zambia and Tanzania.
What are the implications of these documents for
U.S. foreign relations history? Was the region an outlier
or microcosm of wider ~lobal trends? And how should
we remember Kissinger s tenure as secretary of state?
Hopefully these questions will find answers in the coming
years as historians devote more attention to this period,
region, and volume. Whether employing the theoretical
framework of empire or writing in the classic mode of
diplomatic history, they will have many reasons to pick
up Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. 28,
Southern Africa. Congratulations to Burton on a job well
done.
Notes:
1. Numbers in parentheses refer to documents rather than
pages.
2. Cited by Mark Atwood Lawrence, "History from Below: The
United States and Latin America in the Nixon Years," in Nixon
in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, eds. Fredrik
Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford, UK, 2008), 269.
3. Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and
Africa, 1959- 1976 (Chapel Hill, 2002), 293.
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